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THE PROBLEM OF "CANCELLATION"
GILBERT H. MONTAGUE
OF THE NEW YORK BAR
I. "CANCELLATION" FROM THE LEGAL VIEWPOINT
Between September, 1919 and April, 1920, while prices generally were
rising, more orders and larger orders were the rule.This was natural,
because ordinarily prices rise only when demand increases, and increased
demand expresses itself in more orders and larger orders.
Between May, 1920 and May, 1921, while prices generally were
falling, fewer orders and smaller orders were the habit.This alone would
have brought about the general price decline.But the decline was
accelerated, and throughout almost the entire period assumed the velocity
and steepness of a drop, because of the widespread prevalenceof
"cancellation."
"Cancellation," colloquially and in the sense here used, means notifi-
cation by the buyer before delivery that he cancels, wholly or in part,
the order which he has previously placed with the seller.If the seller
has accepted the order when it was placed—and this happens almost
always—what is then called the order is really a legal contract.This
contract obligates the seller to deliver to the buyer the merchandise
specified in the accepted order and obligates the buyer to pay to the seller
the price specified in that order.When, therefore, the buyer "cancels"
the order, in effect he notifies the seller that he considers himself relieved,
in whole or in part, of his legal obligation to take and pay for the merchan-
dise whichhas contracted to buy.
If the seller acquiesces, the "cancellation" wipes out the contract and
all its legal rights and obligations.If the seller does not acquiesce, the
"cancellation" constitutes a repudiation and breach of the contract.
The seller then has ground for a lawsuit against the buyer, in which the
seller only occasionally can compel the buyer to take and pay for the
merchandise; and usually can only obtain judgment against the buyer
for the difference between the price specified in the accepted order and the
"open market" price (as determined by the jury) of merchandise of the
same general class at the time and place of delivery specified inthe order.
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11. THE PREVALENCE OF "CANCELLATIONS" IN 1920-1921
Manufacturers, producers, and sellers, between June, 1920 and May,
1921, were everywhere complaining of "cancellation."If contemporary
testimony may be believed, the prevalence of "cancellation"—" can-
cellitis"asit was humorously called—exceeded anything that had
been experienced for years.No commercial country escaped it, though
British merchants professed that it was less common in Great Britain
than in other countries.American merchants, on the other hand, declared
that it was less common in American domestic trade than in export
trade.No line of business escaped, though perhaps it was most notice-
able in those in which the period is longest between the time of placing
the order and the time for delivery.Trade associations, in conventions
'and committees, adopted resolutions against "cancellation," exhorted
their members to sue all customers who attempted to "cancel orders,"
and in several instances proposed agreements binding their members to
such action."Cancellation" nevertheless continued and was one of the
chief phenomena, and perhaps one of the chief accelerants, of the price
decline throughout that period.
Since "cancellation" is legally nothing but repudiation and breach
of contract, the question may be asked: Why does any commerpial
community tolerate it?
In some lines of business, "cancellation" is practically unknown. A
banker, who would attempt the "cancellation" of his commitment to
purchase and pay for the securities of a tire manufacturer whom he had
undertaken to finance would promptly find himself ostracized.If a
member of a Stock Exchange, after selling on the floor some securities to
another member and receiving the latter's confirmation, should later
receive a "cancellation" of it, he would promptly sell the securities for
the latter's account and hold the latter liable for any deficiency.No
ftnancial stringency or trade condition would justify failure by the
banker or the Stock Exchange member to fulfill his legal obligations
under these transactions.
But if a dealer had ordered $10,000 worth of tires from this same tire
Enanufacturer, or if the tire manufacturer had ordered $25,000 worth
)f fabric from a textile manufacturer, and a price decline had followed,
the dealer and the tire manufacturer might at any time before delivery
attempt "cancellation" of their respective orders with relatively little
danger of moral opprobrium.And if their respective sellers should
resist "cancellation," without offering some reduction in price, or some
"adjustment" to "absorb" or "split" part of the loss, trade sympathy
would largely favor the buyer as against the unyielding seller.
In some sections of the business community, accepted orders for
aierchandise seem to lack most of the sanctity that belongs to contracts
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In certain lines of business, in normal times, an accepted order, in
spite of its legal status as a contract, may before delivery be cancelled
by the buyer almost at will without objection by the seller:.So long as
buyers and sellers, in normal times, commonly disregard the legal signifi-
cance of accepted orders, it is not surprising that their legal enforcement
in abnormal times seems to the buyer wholly unjust.
m.TYPESOF SELLERS' CONTRACTS WHICH TEMPT BUYERS TO CANCEL
ORDERS
In some lines of business an accepted order, in the form which the!
sellers have succeeded in imposing upon the trade, binds the buyer so
tightly, while permitting the seller such latitude as to time and quantity!
to be delivered, that the buyer's situation, according to his own opinion
at least, is almost intolerable, unless he be allowed by custom considerable
latitude in "cancellation."
In the textile industry, orders frequently are accepted "subject to
release for all or part of same in case of fires, strikes, lock-outs or other
unavoidable delay caused by casualities or occurrences over which we
have no control," or on condition that in event of "unavoidable casuality,
the deliveries shall only be made proportionate to the production."
In the canning industry, orders frequently are accepted on condition
that the seller guarantee delivery only "of the pro rata amount of each
item on this order, such as the total quantity ordered from all sources of
said item bears to the seller's total season's pack thereof," and that the
buyer "shall accept delivery of any portion of this order at such times as
seller is able to deliver."
Whoever has collected sales contract forms adopted or recommended
by trade associations must be impressed by the frequency with which
clauses like these are imposed by sellers upon buyers.
Under such clauses sellers may, in the events specified, which neces-
sarily are for the most part solely within the sellers' knowledge, deliver
only a part, or none, of the quantity ordered.
During the period of rising prices, between the summer of 1919 and
the spring of 1920, court calendars, which frequently are a significant
index of disturbed business conditions, abounded in cases in which buyers
charged sellers with unscrupulous conduct under contracts containing
clauses similar to these, and the Federal Trade Commission was flooded
with complaints against sellers who, it was charged, were utilizing thesc
and similar clauses to withhold deliveries on orders that had been accepted
at low prices many months before, and were selling surreptitiously th
quantities so withheld to new purchasers at greatly increased prices
Just as excessive harshness in criminal statutes breeds laxity in theh
observance and enforcement, so excessive harshness in sales
breeds the spirit that leads to "cancellation.""CANCELLATION" 173
lv.ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRACTICE
But even if harsh sales contracts were abolished, "cancellation"
would still exist.
So long as eager sellers, competing with one another to obtain more
larger others, encourage buyers to order too much rather than too
ittle, and so long as eager sellers, competing with one another to obtain
,he good-will of buyers, dare not offend buyers byresisting "cancellation,"
cancellationwill continue.As prosperity approaches high tide and
the probability of turning over merchandise at a profit diminishes,
myers are thus induced to continue ordering, knowing that "cancellation"
vill be tolerated and that at any time before delivery they can avoid their
osses and throw them back upon the sellers.This is the real evil of
'cancellation."
In extreme cases, buyers at the peak of the boom, expecting that they
will receive only a moderate quota of what they order, place orders for
wo or three times the quantity of goods they need, or order the full bill
rom two or three different houses.Such practices would be exceedingly
4sky were orders generally treated as contracts.As matters stand, the
)ractice is not only common, but also has been encouraged in some cases
y over-zealous salesmen who wish to book the business.These inflated
)rders may deceive the wholesale merchants and manufacturers regarding
the extent of the demand and lead them in turn to place larger orders for
or materials than they can use.Thus the practice of "cancella-
ion" aggravates the business errors committed in boom periods.
The other side of the practice becomes obvious alter the tide has
urned."Cancellation" then wipes out the demand expressed in the
and destroys the support which the order gave to the price level.
since "cancellation," like any other repudiation or breach of contract
s always a disappointment and frustration of hope, "cancellation"
the general price decline much more than refusal originally to
lace the order could possibly have done.
If accepted orders for merchandise had everywhere the same sanctity
hat belongs to contracta generally, and if "cancellation" were wholly
bbohshed, prices would nevertheless rise and fall, and speculation would
Our Stock Exchanges prove that speculation exists even when
are strictly enforced.But imagine what speculation on the
itock Exchange would be if repudiation and breach of contracts were
olerated!Here is simply another proof that speculation in industry is
indoubtedly more excessive than speculation on any Stock Exchange.If
trade association action, or by trade education, or by recommendation
tom individual banks and from the Federal Reserve Banks, the practice
)f "cancellation" could be diminished, speculation in industry would be
within narrower bounds.